Expanding on earlier observations of the Zhuhai Airshow
I commented on the emerging main themes of weapon system development in China as shown at the Zhuhai Airshow. I thought it worthwhile to explore them in some depth.
Key emerging themes in military-tech that reflects the Chinese military doctrines of Mechanization, Informationization, Intelligentization, Networked Battlefield, and Multi-domain Precision Warfare:
- Stealth
o J20S (two seater version of J20 with copilot dedicated for loyal wingman control) and J35A fighters (air force fighter with a sister carrier version to be launched)
o Jari/Orca - the world’s largest stealth unmanned surface combat ship with 420-ton displacement and 58 meter long hull. It features 16 vertical launch system (VLS) for anti-ship and air defence missiles as well as a torpedo tube for submarine attacks. It has an integrated mast with advanced synthetic aperture radar (ASAR) and helicopter/UAV pad. Its top speed is 40 knots and max range is 7,400 km.
o WZ-8 hypersonic deep penetration ISR and strike drone. Max speed is Mach 7.
o CH-7 and CH-9 high altitude long endurance (HALE) unmanned bombers. CH-7 has a range of 2000 km, max speed of 900 km/h, takeoff weight of 10,000 kg and 15 hour endurance. CH-9 is claimed to have a range of 11,500 km and can cover continental US. It was not displayed in Zhuhai.
- Multi-domain uncrewed systems – UAVs for ISR and strike, unmanned troop carrier and battle tank, swarming robot combat dog, etc. for the army, unmanned surface combat ship, and unmanned submarine (UUV)
o Jari/Orca is a noteworthy first of its kind stealth uncrewed combat surface ship with a trimaran design, vertical launcher and anti-surface/anti-submarine capabilities
o WZ-8, CH-7, WZ-10 are good examples of latest stealth unmanned drones designed for ISR, bombing and electronic warfare missions. No comparable drones have been fielded by the western bloc.
o Jiutian is another first of its kind heavy duty ISR/combat drone which also serves as a swarming drone mothership (theatrically called “mother of all drones” by some). Presumably this is similar to the much taunted US concept-level Replicator swarming drone system. China is likely to have iterated one or two generations further if and when the USAF can materialize its design concept.
- Networked intelligent systems based on deep integration of AI and robotics - such as swarming systems
o A recent airshow celebrating National Day in southern China involved synchronized swarming performance of 12,000 drones controlled by one laptop (a world record). Though it was a civilian demonstration, the military application was clear. In fact, the military probably has fielded much more advanced swarming capabilities already.
o At the Zhuhai show, a large scale road-mobile anti drone defence system with directed energy weapon (DEW) system was displayed.
- Hypersonic – aerial weapons with Mach 5 and above flight and attack velocity
o China leads the world in hypersonic technology by a wide margin, thanks to its highly advanced wind tunnel testing infrastructure and the contribution of the late founding missile scientist Qing Xueshen (the inventor of the famed Qing Xueshen Ballistic Trajectory)
o China has long fielded a suite of hypersonic missile systems with various attack range, launch platforms and mission types (DF17, DF21, DF26, DF27, DF31, DF41, CJ100, YJ21). These hypersonic missiles are customize-designed to attack carrier groups as well as US forward-deployed military bases in the first and second island chains.
o A first-of-its-kind weapon-in-weapon system named GDF600 was demonstrated. It is a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) with 600 km range and with sub-munitions that can be launched during flight that can target multiple targets in a broad area after initial penetration
As shown above, China is experimenting and fielding any number of classified and declassified combinations of above capabilities for the modern battlefield: Jiutian – the drone mothership, GDF600 – HGV with sub-munition, CH-7 – stealth unmanned bomber, J20S – stealth fighter with swarming loyal wingman drones.
These modern kill chains are built on several foundational technologies such as communication and AI. China has heavily invested and achieved technological leadership in these fields.
- Communication – data fusion enabled by sophisticated communication systems is critical for control of unmanned systems, guided munitions, and target acquisition/attack. China’s lead in 5G and 5.5G telecommunication, quantum encryption, satellite communication, quantum encryption and anti-jamming/EW capabilities play a critical role in ensuring battlefield connectivity.
- AI decision making – China has prioritized industry vertical AI (such as internet of things and robotics) for commercial and military applications, compared with the US focus on generative AI or AGI which has yet to deliver tangible results and return on investment.
- China is also investing in high capacity energy storage and power plants, which have both extensive civilian and military applications (e.g. ship-born directed energy weapon, battery-powered long endurance drones and loitering munitions, etc.)
In addition to these capabilities, perhaps most importantly for future wars, China enjoys vast supply chain and domain resource sharing advantages via its civilian military fusion (CMF) projects and whole-of-nation mobilization. For example, all military shipyards also contract for civilian ship building.
Many military technologies share civilian tech, industrial base and infrastructure – for example, in combat drone development and production. Civilian manufacturer DJI has dominant global market position in commerical drones but the supply chain and industrial base it depends on can be leveraged for military purpose. As all major military contractors are state owned, there is also extensive and little-constrained resource and technology sharing.
Similarly, China can easily mobilize its vast industrial base for wartime production, thus enjoying a virtual limitless surge capacity over opponents.
Such overwhelming quantitative advantages coupled with peer or above-peer level technologies ensure battlefield dominance.
Learnings from the Ukraine war and middle eastern war – at the Zhuhai Airshow, many weapon systems clearly embody the lessons from the recent Russian-Ukraine, Israel-Middle East wars:
- The battlefield of tomorrow will be contests of systems. As shown by the repeated success of cheap drones destroying heavy capital assets like tanks and surface ships, networked systems will overwhelm stand-alone legacy platforms with their numerical and intelligence advantages. The Chinese doctrine of intelligentized warfare is playing out on the battlefield. The integrated networks of sensors, data link, AI connected through communication platforms represent a virtual “military internet of things”.
- Long distance precision strike capability is critical. As shown in the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea against the US, UK navies, even weak powers can achieve asymmetrical advantage if they can deliver long-distance precision strike. Even when many of their drones and missiles are intercepted, the cost exchange ratio is heavily against the expensively equipped western bloc countries.
- War of attrition is the norm for major power conflicts. Quantity matters in such wars so the ability to produce at scale and low cost is critical to outlast opponents. Russia’s battlefield success is a result of its outproducing the collective west in munitions. It’s clear the west today simply does not have surge capacity for almost any weapon types including basic artillery rounds. China has an order-of-magnitude bigger industrial base than the Russians and can easily outproduce the US and its allies.
- The US military doctrine of the last 3 decades emphasizes short wars which it can dominate with overwhelming fire power. Such a doctrine may work against weak low tech opponents with no industrial base. But it is defunct for major power conflict. In fact, this pervasive doctrine is hugely damaging to its war preparedness in the form of low stockpile of expensive ammunitions, high casualty aversion, and long supply and logistics chains. It is outmatched.
o In April this year, Israel, the US, UK and their allies fired interceptors worth an estimated $3-4 billion to defend against the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. The old Iranian drones and missiles was said to cost less than $100 million. Such cost-exchange ratio is unsustainable for the west in a large-scale high intensity contest with a peer opponent.
- The above mentioned Chinese unmanned stealth bomber CH-7 performs many similar functions as US B2 bomber which costs $2.1 billion per unit on average ($4.04 billion in 2023). B2 is a stealth flying wing bomber with 11,000 km range and 16-ton payload. CH-7 is a deep-penetration flying wing stealth bomber with 9000 km range, 13-ton take-off weight and 2-ton payload. While technically less sophisticated, CH-7 unit cost is $4 million. For a manned bombing mission launched with a single B2, China can launch 5-600 CH-7 unmanned bomber drones.
Even adjusting performance vastly in favor of B2, the cost-exchange differential is extreme. In addition to the unit cost of a B2, total procurement costs (spare parts, equipment, retrofitting, and software support) average $929 million ($1.1 billion in 2023) per plane. We can safely assume the entire development and deployment of CH-7’s successor generation bomber will be far less than the cost of a single B2 bomber, which is actually ear-marked for decommission soon.
- There is no such thing as a miracle weapon. The simple truth is shown repeatedly since the beginning of the conflict. None of the famed Javelin anti-tank missile, HIMARS, Patriot Air-defence system, M1A1 Abrams tank, F16 fighter, and most recently ATACMs missile have proved to be “game-changers”. Russians quickly adapted and came up with counter measures. The small quantity of such weapons can hardly inflict debilitating damage to an opponent like Russia.
Ultimately, wars are won only by redundant, multi-layered and multi-domain weapon systems supplied in quantity and at scale and in time.
- War is about supply chain competition as much as other things. One observer at the show made an insightful comment on TV: the Russian Ukraine unmanned aerial war is largely fought with consumer tech level parts, components and software you can get off the shelf in a large Shenzhen electronics mall. Maybe somewhat exaggerated, it is largely true. Shenzhen alone has the industrial capacity and all requisite technological resources to supply both sides of the war easily.
Gaps in US war strategy
- Legacy burden: many of the air frames and hulls in USAF and US Navy are 3 decades old, cannot be modernized and upgraded to incorporate latest electronic and weapon systems. They are also more expensive to maintain and service than for China to build new systems.
o In October, US Navy announced 12 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are extending their 35-year service life as new ships cannot be built to replace them
o US ships and submarines typically spend more time waiting for service than being serviced
o F35 requires 9 hours’ servicing for every 1 hour of flying
- However, those are not bugs of the system but its features so they cannot be reformed as that would go against vested interests. This same logic applies to the country’s political system.
The key elements of US military industry complex business model:
o Build large expensive platforms with lots of features (some far too technically complicated) in very long time
o Build closed system of proprietary technologies that make military dependent on the manufacturer to maintain and upgrade these platforms for the decades they are in service (e.g. F35 program)
o Ensure no change to the status quo through lobbyists, think tanks, revolving door between Pentagon, congress and MIC
o Consolidate the industry to 5 or 6 main contractors and ensure monopoly profits
o Low motivation for cost control as military procurement is based on cost-plus accounting with guaranteed profit. In fact, the higher the cost, the higher the profit.
- US military doctrine and war planning is flawed. For decades, they are optimized around
o Technically inferior opponent such as insurgents
o Uncontested battlefield
o Safe rear for stockpiling and resupply
o Slow kill chain as opponents is vastly under-armed
o Little attrition or casualty in combat
o Vassalized “allies” serve as cannon fodder as in Ukraine – the problem is the trick can only be used before even the vassals catch on.
None of above conditions exist in a war with China and the US game plan and capabilities horned to fight a weak opponent will prove deadly (to itself) against a peer. The so-called “experience advantage” since US has been in non-stop wars is an actual deathtrap as such “experience” ensures the rank and file keep fighting the last war.
- At the end of the day, US military dominance is simply exaggerated due to the weakness of the opponents it has been fighting – the military equivalent of a heavy weight boxer fighting a feather weight or a full grown man beating up a toddler. The US military is as untested as most other militaries in high intensity high tech modern wars. Undeserved and entrenched hubris will be fatal.
China’s home court advantages in a war in western Pacific
- Chinese leadership, mostly trained as engineers, have long appreciated the potential of technology far more deeply than their US counterparts who are mainly trained as lawyers, or in the present case, a property developer/TV personality.
- Chinese military has been preparing for an eventual showdown with the US since the 1996 Taiwan crisis and 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing by the US and NATO.
- It has been developing fit for purpose A2AD strategy and matching capabilities designed to counter US intervention near Chinese shores.
- These efforts started with a modest Assassin’s Mace asymmetrical war plan (with one or two unexpected killer weapons) to fully blown A2AD capabilities based on a multi-domain kill chain centered around hypersonic strike capacity plus advanced multi-platform target acquisition system.
- China has built a navy and air force capable beyond homeland defence and can take the war beyond the first and second island chains if needed.
- China has also developed credible nuclear second strike capabilities that include DF31, DF41, JL-3 and fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) designed for global strike. The intent is to negate US nuclear blackmail.
o FOBS HGV strategic nuclear warhead was tested in 2021 and flew 40,000 km (earth circumference) in 100 minutes and strike within a few miles of the target. It has Mach 21-25 speed, high manoeuvrability, unpredictable attack vector (e.g. from south pole). It is a nuclear attack system that is impossible to defend against. The impact is the equivalent of a meteorite strike.
o DF 41 – road mobile, solid fuel, hypersonic ICBM, speed up to Mach 25, carry multiple re-entry vehicle nuclear warheads and can strike Washington from Beijing in 30 minutes
Predictions on the result of a second head-to-head Sino-US war
- China has always refused to be bullied and intimidated by the US and the west since the founding of the republic. China fought a war against US in Korea in 1951-3 when the US was at the pinnacle of industrial, military and financial power and when China was extremely impoverished and poorly armed. The Chinese army pushed the US back from the Yalu River to the 38 parallel line. That was the first war the US didn’t win. People forget that since it has lost numerous other wars since then (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). But China was the first country who fought the US to a tie at the height of its power.
- 70+ years later, the China today is not the weak China of 1951 and the US is not the dominant US of 1951. A battlefield contest is very likely analogous to what happened in the automotive industry – China with its modern kill chain will overwhelm US legacy systems the same way BYD does to Ford with EVs.
The Zhuhai Airshow this year, more than any other event, is showing China’s resolve to stay at the cutting edge of military technological innovation and will defend its sovereignty in major power wars that seem destined to come.
Sun Tzu, in his Art of War, said 2600 years ago that the best way to win a war is to win without fighting by letting your enemy know your strength. Same applies today. The philosophy does not imply bluffing but rather dealing with your opponent from a position of strength. This is what the Zhuhai show is really about.